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ABSTRACT 
 In the FORCEnet Functional Concept document published by the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the leaders of the US Naval Forces 
called for the development of “adaptive, distributed networks of commanders, staffs, 
operating units, supporting organizations, sensors, weapons and other equipment 
interacting with one another on an underlying infrastructure, as well as the associated 
command and control policies, concepts, organizations… to allow them to interact.”  
Posed to invest in the development of the FORCEnet architecture, the Navy and Marine 
Corps require a means of analysis to determine the value of information technologies 
prior to development and acquisition. The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology 
can provide the decision makers with quantitative tools to make informed and accurate 
decisions in the acquisitions process of information technologies within the FORCEnet 
Functional Concept framework.  Historically, these decisions were based on costs, 
schedule, and capabilities, with the emphasis on cost.    
 A Proof of Concept analyzing the Joint Forces Maritime Component Command 
Planning Process was developed to demonstrate the utility of the KVA method.  This 
analysis demonstrates the current inefficiencies within the process and the potential value 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense, along with all other government agencies, operates in 
an environment of competition for limited funding resources.  In this environment, the 
military services must concurrently prosecute the missions assigned for the defense of the 
nation and its interests, while looking toward the future to develop the systems that will be 
applied to the nation’s defense in the years to come.  Through decisions made today, the 
systems that support the nations forces will be conceptualized, developed, and deployed to 
meet the future threats to our nation.  To continue to thrive in this environment of limited 
budgets, the United States Navy must determine the future capabilities of the force and be 
able to soundly present the reasoning objectively to decision makers in the Department of 
Defense and Congress. 
It is estimated by experts at the Government Electronics and Information 
Technology Association that the Department of Defense will spend approximately $702 
billion on C4ISR research projects and procurement in the decade spanning from 2006 to 
2016, with information technologies accounting for an estimated $30.1 billion in 2006.1  
With such a large sum of tax dollars being invested in information technologies, it is 
imperative that the decision makers that allocate funds invest in the right systems that will 
prove most beneficial to the military services and the national defense.   
 
B.  PURPOSE 
In the Department of the Navy Publication “FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for 
the 21st Century” the leaders of the United States Navy and Marine Corps propose 
FORCEnet as a capability which will “empower Sailors and Marines at all levels to execute 
more effective decision-making at an increased operational tempo” resulting in greater 
                                                 
1 John Keller, Reductions Eyed for Battle Management and Information Technology Spending.  Military 




effectiveness and mission accomplishment.2  The FORCEnet concept is to serve as the 
catalyst for naval transformation and revolutionizing naval command and control. To realize 
FORCEnet, the US Navy and Marine Corps are poised to invest a great deal of resources to 
develop and adopt the technologies that will make it possible.   
With the publication of Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) 
TACMEMO 3-32-03 “Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning 
and Execution” in June 2004, the Navy, for the first time, formalized into doctrine the 
planning process to be executed by its commanders at sea.  The planning process as 
executed today is very manpower intensive and is largely unsupported by information 
technology (IT) systems. This research will address the benefits of the development of and 
fielding of IT systems to support the crisis action planning process of the US Navy.    
A case study, observed during the Trident Warrior 2005 experiment, will serve as a 
baseline “as-is” of the planning process.  It will provide measures by which the 
incorporation of IT systems can be evaluated.  In this research, the Knowledge Value Added 
(KVA) methodology will be used to compare the “as-is” process to the processes where 
notional IT systems are incorporated.  The results of these comparisons will be provided to 
the US Navy as recommendations for or against the development of IT systems to aid the 
planning process. 
 
C.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to analyze the potential benefits of the development 
of FORCEnet IT systems to assist decision-making in turbulent environments.  Specifically, 
this research will evaluate the JFMCC Planning Process as conducted during crisis action 
planning in Trident Warrior 2005.  Prior to providing recommendations for future systems, a 
baseline analysis of the JFMCC planning process must be conducted to establish the current 
state of the process.  With the baseline established, a future IT system can be evaluated 
within the process and the analysis of its impact conducted. 
 
                                                 
2 Department of the Navy Publication, (2005) “FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century,” 
Introduction by Clark, V. Chief of Naval Operations and Hagee, M. Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
Washington: Department of the Navy. 
3 
D.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
The development of IT systems is a high risk endeavor.  According to David Haas, 
writing in the Defense Acquisitions University periodical Program Manager, the failure rate 
of IT acquisitions programs is as high as 83%3.  This high failure rate coupled with the vast 
sums of money allocated to IT systems requires that objective and quantifiable information 
be provided to decision makers so that the benefits of such programs are maximized in the 
processes they support.   
The primary question of this thesis is: What is the value of FORCEnet IT systems 
when employed in turbulent decision-making environments, specifically the JFMCC 
planning process?  The answer to this question will provide the decision maker a solid basis 
for selecting where the funds of today should be invested to provide the greatest return for 
the Navy of the future. 
 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will model the JFMCC planning process as conducted during the 
experiment Trident Warrior 2005 and establish the baseline analysis of the planning process 
using the KVA methodology.  In conducting the KVA analysis, the return on investment for 
each of subprocesses and the planning process as a whole will be determined.  With the 
return on investment baseline established, a hypothetical scenario with notional FORCEnet 
technologies will be evaluated to determine the impact of the IT systems within the JFMCC 
planning process. 
 
F.  SCOPE 
The JFMCC Planning Process formalized in the Navy Warfare Development 
Command TACMEMO 3-32-03 is specific to crisis action planning at the operational and 
tactical levels of warfare.  However, it is not specific to the US Navy.  The JFMCC Planning 
Process is in concert with the US Army and US Marine Corps planning processes.  
Therefore, although this thesis uses the JFMCC planning process for analysis, the results of 
                                                 
3 David Haas, Government-wide Information Technology (IT) Acquisitions. Program Manager. 12. May 
June 2003.  Retrieved April 2006 from http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pm/pmpdf03/may/has-m-j03.pdf 
 
4 
this thesis can provide insight to both the Army and Marine Corps decision makers for the 
acquisition of new IT systems to support the planning process of their respective service. 
 
G.  ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis will be organized in the following manner: 
Chapter I will provide an overview of this research project and will present to the 
reader the primary objectives and questions on which it will focus.  The research 
methodology and the scope of this thesis will be described. 
Chapter II will provide the necessary information for understanding the JFMCC 
planning process as described in NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03 that serves as the basis for 
the “as-is” model of the planning process.  The topics covered in this chapter include the 
FORCEnet Functional Concept, the JFMCC Planning Process, a brief description of 
notional technologies to support the military planning, Return on Investment, and IT 
Acquisitions for the DoD. 
Chapter III discusses the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology in detail to 
enhance the readers understanding of the knowledge-based return on investment analysis 
from which this thesis draws its conclusions and recommendations. 
Chapter IV will provide the analysis of the “as-is” planning process and will make 
prospective analysis of notional planning processes that incorporate IT systems to aid the 
human in accomplishing the planning. 
Chapter V summarized the research presented and will state conclusions and provide 
recommendations to the Navy and the Department of Defense as a whole regarding the 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  FORCENET 
The FORCEnet concept will serve as the primary driver of the transformation of the 
command and control of naval forces.  FORCEnet ”...describes the principles, defines the 
capabilities, and reaffirms the necessity of co-evolving information technology with 
organization, process, and doctrine.”4  
1.  The FORCEnet Vision 
In the FORCEnet Functional Concept document published by the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the leaders of the US Naval Forces 
called for the development of “adaptive, distributed networks of commanders, staffs, 
operating units, supporting organizations, sensors, weapons and other equipment interacting 
with one another on an underlying infrastructure, as well as the associated command and 
control policies, concepts, organizations… to allow them to interact.”  The objective of 
these networks is to provide warfighting commanders with the ability to make better, 
timelier decisions than they currently can.5   The various information technology systems 
which will support the networking of the above named facets of the forces are currently 
being investigated.  However, each emergent technology does not hold equal value when 
placed in the context of the process it will support.  For the functional concept to be 
realized, the information technologies that are being adapted must be analyzed individually 
and as a system of systems to assure that they are adding value to the processes 
accomplished by the warfighting commanders and staffs.   
2.  FORCEnet and Command and Control 
Command and control is the means and methods by which a commander 
recognizes that needs to be done in any situation and sees that appropriate 
actions are taken... It ranges from the intuitive judgments that only skilled 
and experienced people can perform to the precise, instantaneous 
determinations that only automation can perform.6   
                                                 
4 Department of the Navy Publication, (2005) “FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century,” 
Introduction by Clark, V. Chief of Naval Operations and Hagee, M. Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
Washington: Department of the Navy. 
5 Ibid., p. 1. 
6 Ibid., pp. 6–7.   
6 
Command and control is not merely a human function; for example the terminal guidance of 
a missile provided by its onboard computer and Global Positioning System receiver is a 
form of command and control.  For real-time command and control of this sort, a human 
decision maker can not process inputs in a timely manner to affect the course of flight 
appropriately.  Other forms of command and control are more appropriate for human 
decision makers.  The employment of military forces through the combined use of strategy, 
operations, and tactics is a form of command and control in which the leadership, as 
compared to direction, is at its fullest.  This is the highest form of command and control.7   
Among the capabilities that are required for the implementation of FORCEnet are:8 
• Process, sort, analyze, evaluate, and synthesize large amounts of disparate 
information while still providing direct access to raw data as required. 
• Provide each decision maker the ability to depict situational information in a 
tailorable, user-defined, sharable, primarily visual representation. 
• Provide distributed groups of decision makers the ability to cooperate in 
performance of common command and control activities by means of 
collaborative work environment. 
• Automate lower-order command and control sub-processes and to use 
intelligent agents and automated decision aids to assist people in performing 
higher-order sub-processes, such as gaining situational awareness and 
devising concepts of operations. 
• Provide decision makers the ability to make and implement good decisions 
quickly under conditions of uncertainty, friction, time, pressure, and other 
stresses. 
The FORCEnet concept is envisioned to allow for commanders operate in a 
collaborative command and control environment, with shorter decision cycles so that 
                                                 
7 Department of the Navy Publication, (2005) “FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century,” 
p. 7. Washington: Department of the Navy.  
8 The complete list of stated FORCEnet capabilities is found in the FORCEnet Functional Concept on 
pages 12 through 19. 
7 
decisions can be made are a tempo which the enemy cannot tolerate.9 To develop the 
information technology required, they must be analyzed within the context of the human-
centric high-order command and control processes. 
The primary decision-making process of the warfighting commander is the planning 
process.  To date, the planning process is not supported at the tactical level with IT that 
allows for more timely and accurate decision-making.  For the FORCEnet concept to be 
realized, initiatives in IT to support the planning process must be developed and 
implemented.   
 
B.  THE JFMCC PLANNING PROCESS 
1.  Organization of the JFMCC Staff 
With the publication of the NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03, the organization of the 
JFMCC staff was formalized to provide a fully integrated naval staff at the operational level 
of war.  The JFMCC Staff organization is based upon the requirement to support the 
JFMCC by: 
• Integrating planning, execution, and assessment with the Joint Forces 
Commander, other component commanders, and subordinate JFMCC 
elements. 
• Providing clear, concise, and uncomplicated plans and orders. 
• Synchronizing the warfighting functions and missions areas throughout the 
maritime force to achieve unity of effort and to harmonize maneuver and 
maximize opportunities for surprise. 
• Coordinate maritime response to emergent battlefield events ensuring 
economy of force to achieve a clear, decisive, and objective while ensuring 
adequate security.10 
To this end, the JFMCC staff is organized into six centers: Knowledge Management, 
Maritime Intelligence and Analysis, Maritime Future Plans, Maritime Operations, Maritime 
                                                 
9 Department of the Navy Publication, (2005) “FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century.” 
Washington: Department of the Navy, p. 1. 
10 Navy Warfare Development Command (2004), “Navy Warfare Development Command TACMEMO 
3-32-03: Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution,” Newport, Navy 
Warfare Development Command, p. 3-1. 
8 
Logistics Coordination, and the Maritime Support Center.  This organization scheme 
replaces the traditional J-coded staff organization (J-1 administration, J-2 Intelligence, J-3 
Operations, J-4 Logistics, J-5 Plans, J-6 Communications) with more functional 
interrelationships within the various centers.  Figure 1 demonstrates the proposed functional 




Figure 1.   Organization of the JFMCC Staff (From NWDC, 2004) 
10 
2.   Future Operations Cell 
Within the Maritime Operations Center, the Future Operations Cell is the primary, 
near-term planning agent of the JFMCC.  The Future Operations Cell translates operational 
objectives assigned to the JFMCC into tactical missions to be assigned to the subordinate 
maritime units.  The Future Operations Cell is also responsible for synchronizing and 
coordinating the missions assigned to subordinate units to achieve unity of effort throughout 
the entire maritime component.  As the Future Operations Cell is focused primarily on 
actions to be taken between 24 and 72 hours in the future, close coordination with the 
Current Operations Cell and the Maritime Future Plans Center is essential to their success.  
To these ends, the Future Operations Cell is organized into the Planning Team, the Maritime 
Tasking Plan/Maritime Support Request Coordination Team, the Orders Production Team, 
and the Liaison Team as depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.   Organization of the Future Operations Cell (From NWDC, 2004) 
 
3. The JFMCC Planning Process 
The JFMCC Planning Process was formally established in June 2004 with the 
publication of NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03.  The TACMEMO provides guidance for the 
planning and execution of maritime operations that require coordination of Navy, Marine 
Corps, and coalition forces within an assigned area of operations.11  The JFMCC planning 
process provides the means by which maritime forces submit inputs into the Joint, 
component, and subordinate planning processes to ensure a unity of effort in accomplishing 
                                                 
11 Navy Warfare Development Command (2004), “Navy Warfare Development Command TACMEMO 
3-32-03: Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution.” Newport. Navy 
Warfare Development Command, Preface. 
11 
missions.12 The JFMCC planning process is executed concurrent with the other component 
(Joint Forces Land Component Command, Joint Forces Air Component Command, Joint 
Forces Special Operations Component Command) planning processes upon receipt of the 
Joint Forces Command (JFC) Operations Order or Warning Order. 
The JFMCC planning process is a top-down process to ensure unity of command 
throughout the maritime forces.  The six steps to the JFMCC planning process are: Mission 
Analysis, Course of Action (COA) Development, COA Analysis, COA Comparison and 
Decision, Orders Development, and Transition.  The JFMCC Planning Process is depicted 
as the six-step sequential process in Figure 3. 
                                                 
12 Navy Warfare Development Command (2004), “Navy Warfare Development Command TACMEMO 
3-32-03: Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution,” Newport, Navy 
Warfare Development Command, p. 4-1 
12 
 
Figure 3.   The JFMCC Planning Process (From NWDC, 2004) 
 
Step 1 - Mission Analysis:  The purpose of mission analysis is to conduct a review 
and analysis of orders, guidance, and any other information provided by the JFC to produce 
13 
a JFMCC mission statement.  This step also provides a means by which the situational 
awareness of the commander is built and shared throughout the planning staff.  The 
commander will deliver guidance and his intent to his planning staff to focus and facilitate 
further planning. 
Step 2 - COA Development: With the JFMCC mission statement, commander’s 
guidance, commander’s intent and JFC mission statement, the planning staff develops 
COAs to accomplish the assigned mission.  Multiple COAs may be developed to provide 
the commander with different methods of achieving the goal.  Each of the COAs developed 
by the planning staff must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.  
They must also be in concert with the mission statement and commander’s guidance and 
intent. 
Step 3 - COA Analysis: During the COA analysis, the planning staff conducts a 
detailed assessment of each of the COAs developed it regard to the enemy and the 
battlespace.  COAs may be compared to potential enemy COAs or reactions to determine 
strengths and weaknesses of the COA.  This will also aid in development of branches 
(deviations from the plan bases upon unfolding events) or sequels (next steps that are taken 
upon completion of a plan).  During the COA analysis, planners identify strengths, 
weaknesses, risks, and equipment or force shortfalls for each COA. 
Step 4 - COA Comparison and Decision: During COA Comparison, the commander 
provides comparison criteria for all COAs and then compares them to each other.  The staff 
and subordinate planners will provide to the commander their recommendations of which 
COA best accomplishes the mission from their perspective.  The commander will then select 
the COA that he determines to best accomplish the mission. 
Step 5 - Orders Development: To communicate the mission to the maritime forces, 
the staff prepares an operations order based upon the COA selected by the commander.  The 
order must include the guidance and intent provided by the commander, along with the 
course of action and the individual subordinate missions. 
14 
Step 6 - Transition:  The goal of the transition step is to ensure an orderly handover 
of the plan to those who will execute the operation.  Further amplification of rationale or 
situational awareness may be required to ensure full understanding of the plan.13 
The planning staff for the JFMCC planning process is an Operational Planning Team 
(OPT).  The members of the OPT are members of the JFMCC future operations staff, liaison 
officers from adjacent and subordinate staffs,  and other external personnel with subject 
matter expertise. 
 
C. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS TO AID THE PLANNING PROCESS 
A Decision Support System (DSS) is a computer tool which assists human decision 
makers in making timelier or more informed decisions.  In complex decision making 
processes with that are time critical and that have great associated risk, such as military 
planning, DSSs provide the greatest potential value. This research will examine a DSS suite 
which may provide automated support to the military planning processes through the use of 
artificial intelligence.  Developed under funding by the Army Research Laboratory, the DSS 
suite comprised of the CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox may aid the planning process in 
unburdening military planners during crisis planning operations by aiding in the analysis of 
intelligence data, development of potential enemy courses of action for analysis, and 
generation of friendly courses of action.  Figure 4 depicts the CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox 





                                                 
13 Navy Warfare Development Command (2004), “Navy Warfare Development Command TACMEMO 
3-32-03: Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution,” Newport, Navy 
Warfare Development Command, pp. 4-3 - 4-4. 
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Figure 4.   The Intelligence Collection and Planning Cycle (From Hayes, et al., 2002) 
 
1.   CoRaven 
CoRaven is a decision support tool designed to aid in the planning process during 
times of crisis by processing a portion of intelligence data for the human operator.  The goal 
of the CoRaven project is to support the human intelligence analyst with “an intelligent 
collaborative multimedia system.” Using Bayesian networks14 as its reasoning tool, 
CoRaven presents visual data to the operator through the use of spatial data in the form of 
                                                 
14 Bayesian networks organize the knowledge in a field of interest as a branching series of cause and 
effect relationships between key variables.  Given the known effects as observed by sensors or reconnaissance 
elements (e.g. troop concentration at a certain location and artillery battalion located at a certain firing 
position) the Bayesian network determines the probability of the potential causes (e.g., the enemy is attacking 
along Route Blue).  More information regarding Bayesian networks can be found at 
http://www.niedermayer.ca/papers/bayesian and http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~murphyk/Bayes/bnintro.html.  
Retreived April 2006. 
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maps, temporal data in the form of synchronization matrices, and graph-based models for 
fusing data to determine supporting evidence.15 
In order for the CoRaven DSS to be functional in times of crisis, the human operator 
inputs his own analytical logic into the system during times of calm, when time is available, 
in the form of logic trees. 
2.  Weasel 
Weasel aids the military planner in developing potential enemy courses of action.  
Given data provided through intelligence analysis regarding the enemy forces disposition 
which is directly transferred from the CoRaven system, constraints of terrain, and 
intelligence assumptions, that are inputted by the human operator based upon enemy 
doctrine or displayed tendencies, Weasel generates a set of possible and likely enemy 
courses of action.  Limitations of Weasel is that it does not identify enemy courses of action 
that are inconsistent with the given inputs and it does not designate a single course of action 
as that which would pose the greatest threat to friendly forces.16  Figure 5 depicts the system 
components of the Weasel decision support tool. 
 
Figure 5.   A System Diagram of Weasel Components (From Hayes, et al., 2002) 
                                                 
15 P. Jones,  et al (1999). “CoRAVEN: Modeling and Design of a Multimedia Intelligent Infrastructure for 
Collaberative Intelligence Analysis.”  Federated Laboratories Annual Research Symposium. Aberdeen. p. 914. 
Retrieved April 2006 from http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel4/5875/15656/00725532.pdf?arnumber=725532 
16 C. Hayes, A. Larson, U. Ravinder (2002), “Weasel: A Mixed-Initiative System to Assist in Military 
Planning.” American Association of Artificial Intelligence. p. 3. Retrieved April 2006 from 
http://www.cs.rochester.edu/research/mipas2005/final-drafts/hayes-larson-ravinder.pdf 
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With Weasel, the military planner can repeat the course of generation multiple times 
varying the inputted constraints or can modify the produced courses of action through the 
graphical user interface.  After refining the set of potential enemy courses of action the 
planner would then select a set of most relevant or most likely course of action against 
which friendly actions can be evaluated.17 
3.  Fox 
Fox is a DSS which assists military planners in identifying potential friendly courses 
of action.  Given a set of potential enemy courses of action, Fox uses a genetic algorithm18 
to generate potential friendly courses of action. 19  Comparing each potential friendly course 
of action to the inputted enemy courses of action, Fox identifies those friendly courses of 
action with the better performance in terms of a “fitness function,” which is computed based 
upon the simulators measure of the remaining strength of friendly units, the remaining 
strength of enemy units, or the amount of terrain gained/lost during the battle.20  Given the 
Fox output, the human decision maker is required to select which course of action for 
development into orders for execution. 
 
D.  RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
1.  Return on Investment Defined 
The term Return on Investment (ROI) most commonly means “... a performance 
measurement used to evaluate the efficiency of an investment or to compare the efficiency 
of a number of different investments. To calculate ROI, the benefit (return) of an investment 
                                                 
17 C. Hayes, A. Larson, U. Ravinder (2002), “Weasel: A Mixed-Initiative System to Assist in Military 
Planning.” American Association of Artificial Intelligence. p. 8. Retrieved April 2006 from 
http://www.cs.rochester.edu/research/mipas2005/final-drafts/hayes-larson-ravinder.pdf 
18 A genetic algorithm is a solution technique which tests a set of solutions against the problem to 
determine an optimal solution.  The initial set of solutions are randomly created and then tested against the 
problem.  The most “fit” of the solutions are modified and selectively combined with other solutions to create 
the next generation of solutions.  This next generation is then tested for “fitness.”  This iterative process 
continues until a predetermined termination criterion is achieved (e.g., a certain number of generations into the 
algorithm, time, or no improvement in fitness is achieved through mutation). Retrieved April 2006 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_algorithm. 
19 U. Ravinder, & C. Hayes (2003). “Weasel: An Automated Planner that Users Can Guide,” IEEE 
Systems, Man and Cybernetics (Washington, October 5-8, 2003). p. 955. Retrieved April 2006 from 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/8811/27871/01243937.pdf?arnumber=1243937 
20 C. Hayes, J. Schlabach, C. Fiebig (1998), “FOX-GA: an Intelligent Planning and Decision Support 
Tool” Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 1998. 1998 IEEE International Conference on Volume 3,  11-14 Oct. 
1998, p.2458. 
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is divided by the cost of the investment; the result is expressed as a percentage or a ratio.”21  
To express ROI as a percentage, the formula for calculation is :  
100%(Revenue - Cost)ROI
Cost
= ×  
When calculating the ROI of an individual investment, a negative ROI (less than 
0.00%) implies that then investment generates a net loss.  An ROI of 0.00% implies that the 
investment “breaks even,” with no net gain or loss of investment.  A positive ROI implies 
that the investment generates a profit for the investor.     
This measure of ROI is of greater value to an investor when two or more alternative 
investments are compared against each other.  For example, if one investment provides a 
higher ROI than an alternative, a logical conclusion is that the investor should invest in the 
investment with the higher ROI. 
Measuring ROI for a commercial organization is a similar process.  The analyst 
needs to determine the costs associated with the investment (equipment, manpower, etc.) 
and the potential future returns that will be generated by the investment.  For example, if a 
company was evaluating whether to invest in a radio advertisement campaign they would 
calculate the costs (production, airtime, etc) and the potential returns (revenue generated by 
the campaign).  If the costs were calculated to be $40,000 and the revenue projected to be 
$75,000, the ROI for the campaign would be 87.5% (ROI = [($75,000 - $40,000)/$40,000] 
x100%).  This measure could then be compared to the alternatives of advertising on 
television or the alternative of not advertising (for which ROI is undefined). 
2.  Non-Profit ROI 
A non-profit organization has been defined as an organization “which exists to do 
good, where the mission is a moral absolute, rather than an economic decision.”  A 
nonprofit organization can be categorized as performing one of the four nonprofit core 
 
 
                                                 




functions: promoting civic or political engagement, providing critical services, providing a 
vehicle for entrepreneurship, or acting as an outlet for the expression of faith and values.22  
While the ROI of a commercial enterprise can be evaluated by looking at historical 
or projected data for costs and revenues, a non-profit organization can not be as easily 
evaluated.  In the non-profit organization, cost data is available (manpower, equipment, 
infrastructure, etc.), but revenue generated is not available because no monetary value is 
assigned to the organizations product.  For such an organization, a method for determining 
the revenue generated must be developed for an ROI analysis to be conducted. 
Like the nonprofit sector, the costs associated with public sector organizations (i.e. 
government agencies) are also easily determined.  Annually, budgets are submitted, 
reviewed, and approved by government organizations and public funds from taxes are 
allocated for the organizational expenses to provide services to the citizens.  This budget 
data presents costs, but does not determine the value of the critical services that the public 
sector organization provides.   
As with the nonprofit organization, government organizations do not easily lend 
themselves to an ROI analysis by virtue of the lack of revenue generated by the 
organization.  Government services are not provided in a free market, largely because no 
single primary benefactor of a government service exists.  Rather, the community as a whole 
benefits from the public sector organization.  The value of fire departments and police 
departments is easy to theoretically grasp, so much that the existence of these organizations 
are largely unquestioned.  However, since these organizations are not revenue generators in 
a market sense, one cannot readily assign a monetary value to the outputs generated by them 
(e.g. sense of security).  Since the services provided by public sector organizations are not 
open to free market competition, where the outputs are available from multiple sources at 
varying degrees of quality and price, revenues need to be determined through other means. 
It is commonly accepted that an ROI analysis of a private sector organization can 
provide information on where investments should be made to increase the profitability of 
the organization.  For the public sector organization, increased profitability is not a likely 
                                                 
22 M. Dube, B. Vetting (2004), “MBA Professional Report: Lessons for the DoD from the Nonprofit 
Sector.” Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, p. 3. 
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outcome, since no profit is currently achieved.  Rather, an ROI analysis will potentially 
demonstrate where costs in the system to produce the service output can be improved 
through efficiency so that a more economical use of public funds can be achieved.   
3.  Information Technology ROI 
As stated in the FORCEnet Functional Concept, one of the capabilities required to 
achieve the FORCEnet vision is to “automate lower-order command and control functions 
and use intelligent agents and automated decision aids to assist people in performing higher-
order sub-processes, such as gaining situational awareness and devising concepts of 
operations.”  Through the implementation of information technologies to accomplish lower-
order tasks, it is envisioned that those subprocesses that require little or no judgment will be 
conducted more efficiently and with greater accuracy than a human operator could.  The 
human who currently is employed with these tedious tasks could be freed to conduct 
subprocesses requiring greater human judgment.  The resulting efficiency in use of human 
capital will present itself in lower costs with the labor intensive tasks and will likely 
improve the ROI of the process as a whole. 
Given the benefits envisioned through the implementation of information 
technologies in command and control processes, a means to objectively and consistently 
measure the impact of an investment on the processes they operate within is required. 
a. Current Approaches 
There are currently a number of approaches to measuring the impact of 
information technology on an organizations performance.  Table 1 summarizes these 
approaches and their associated advantages and disadvantages: 
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Common Approaches to Measuring the Return on IT 
Level of 
Analysis 
Approach Focus Example Key 
Assumption 
Key Advantage Limitation 
Process of 
Elimination 
Treats effect of IT on 
ROI as a residual 
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effects of IT through 













analysis on large 
data sets to show 
contributions of 
IT at firm level 
"Black-box" 
approach with no 
intermediate 

































Determines the best 
point at which to 
exercise an option to 





option = value 
Predicting the 
future value of an 
IT investment 
No surrogate for 





indicators to derive 
unique contributions 



















Use cost to 








cost ≈ value 
Captures 
accurate cost of 
IT 
No surrogate for 
revenue at sub 
corporate level  -- 







Allocating revenue to 







to output ≈ IT 
value-added 
Allocates 
revenue and cost 
of IT allowing 
ratio analysis of 
IT value-added 
Does not apply 
directly to highly 
creative 
processes 
Table 1.   Common Approaches to Measuring the Return on IT ( From Pavlou, P., et al., 2005) 
  
These approaches can be categorized into two groups based upon the levels 
at which they analyze the impact of the information technology, the corporate level and the 
sub-corporate level.  The corporate level analysis approaches seek to determine the 
contribution of assets on the overall performance of the organization.  The sub-corporate 
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approaches attempt to look internal to the organization at the processes which produce the 
organization’s output and to measure the impact of assets within these processes.  The 
overall goal for each of these approaches is to provide to the decision maker a measure of 
the impact of information technology investments at the particular level at which they 
analyze. 
b. DoD Information Technology Investments 
The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, commonly 
known as the Clinger-Cohen Act, had a dramatic impact on the federal government and the 
way by which information technologies were developed and purchased.  The Clinger-Cohen 
Act mandated that the Chief Information Officers review the acquisition of information 
technology systems and provide accountability for the investments made.23   The Clinger-
Cohen Act directed that the acquisition of, planning for, and management of technology be 
treated as “capital investments” and that DoD, along with all other federal agencies, 
conducts a cost/benefit analysis of the technology prior to purchase.24   
The following chapters provide detailed background information of the 
Knowledge Value Added methodology and demonstrate the use of the methodology as a 








                                                 
23 M. Browning, (June 20, 2005). “Executive Suite: Putting the Clinger-Cohen Act into Perspective.” 
Government Computer News, 24.  Retrieved April 2006 from http://www.gcn.com/24_15/project-
management/36103-1.html 
24 Department of Education. “Clinger-Cohen Act.” Retrieved April 2006 from 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/cca.html. 
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III. THE KNOWLEDGE VALUE-ADDED METHODOLOGY 
A.   THE VALUE PROBLEM 
The Clinger-Cohen Act directs that a cost/benefit analysis for IT systems be 
conducted prior to the acquisition of the systems.  To be mathematically correct, in 
determining the ROI for an IT investment, the value of an investment must be established in 
a unit of measure common with the cost of the investment.  Since the “cost” associated with 
IT investments is monetary, the value derived from the benefits must also be stated in 
monetary terms.  In private sector organizations, the monetary value can be measured when 
assigning the unit price to the process output.  However, this measure of value does not 
provide a complete understanding of the value of the investment made.  It captures the value 
only at the boundary between the process and the free market.  It does not determine the 
value of the process assets that work within the organization to produce the final product. 
In nonprofit and public sector organizations the difficulty of assigning value to an 
investment is greater.  The DoD, for example, is incapable of determining directly the 
monetary value of IT investments because it does not offer its process outputs to the free 
market.  Therefore it is necessary that an alternative common unit be used in determining 
the value of investments. 
 
B.  THE KNOWLEDGE VALUE-ADDED METHODOLOGY 
The Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) methodology provides a framework for 
determining the value of subprocesses and process assets within an organizational process.  
Developed by Dr. Thomas Housel and Dr. Valery Kanevsky of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, KVA addresses the longstanding need of executives and managers to be able to 
measure the value of the knowledge that exists within employees, processes, and IT.  The 
KVA analysis produces a return-on-knowledge (ROK) ratio to show the estimated value 





1.  KVA Theory 
The KVA methodology was developed on the concepts of entropy and complexity25, 
stating that organizations add value through its core processes by changing the process 
inputs (e.g. raw materials, labor, energy, information) into the process outputs (e.g. products 
and services) that generate the organization’s revenue.26 The amount of change that occurs 
to the input to create the output can therefore be a measure of the value added during the 
process. 
KVA uses a knowledge-based metaphor to operationalize the relationship between 
the change that occurs to the input to generate the output through the organizations core 
processes.  The amount of change can be described in terms of the amount of knowledge 
required to make that change.  Figure 6 depicts the key assumptions of the KVA 
methodology.   
 
 
Figure 6.   Fundamental Assumptions of KVA (From Housel & Bell, 2001) 
                                                 
25 In simple terms, the Kolmogorov Complexity (K-Complexity) of an object is the length of the shortest 
possible computer program which can replicate the object.  A more complex object requires a greater amount 
of knowledge to replicate. (“Greg Harfst's Home Page: Kolmogorov Complexity.” Retrieved April 2006 from 
http://nms.csail.mit.edu/~gch/kolmogorov.html). 
26 T. Housel, & A. Bell, (2001), Managing and Measuring Knowledge. Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education. pp. 91–92. 
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2.  Identification of Core Processes 
In order to utilize the KVA methodology, the core processes of the organization that 
creates the output from inputs must be identified and the change that occurs to the process 
inputs within these processes must be defined.  To this end various sources of information 
may be called upon to ensure that the completeness of the list.  For example, an analyst may 
use a survey of organizational managers or executives, queries of subject matter experts who 
are familiar with the organization, or procedural publications or checklists that identify the 
processes in a linear system.  Key to the identification of the core processes is the 
identification of the boundaries of the processes, where the process outputs can be identified 
for each individual core process prior to the initiation of a proceeding process. 
3.  Approaches to Measuring Knowledge 
The knowledge within an organization’s processes can be measured through various 
means so long as the basic assumptions of KVA are satisfied and the approach is used to 
consistently throughout the core process.  For the purposes of this research, the Learning 
Time, Process Description, and Binary Query Method techniques are presented in Table 2, 
with the Learning Time Approach described in greater detail in narrative. 
 
Step Learning Time Process Description Binary Query Method 
1. Identify core process and its subprocesses. 
2. Establish common units to 
measure learning time. 
Describe the product in terms 
of the instructions required to 
reproduce them and select unit 
of process description. 
Create a set of binary yes/no 
questions such that all possible 
outputs are represented as a 
sequence of yes/no answers. 
3. Calculate the learning time to 
execute each subprocess. 
Calculate number of process 
instructions pertaining to each 
subprocess. 
Calculate length of sequence 
of yes/no answers for each 
subprocess. 
4. Designate sampling time period long enough to capture a representative sample of the core 
process's final product/service output. 
5. Multiply the learning time for 
each subprocess by the 
number of times the 
subprocess executes during 
the sample period. 
Multiply the number of process 
instructions used to describe 
each subprocess by the 
number of times the 
subprocess executes during 
the sample period. 
Multiply the length of yes/no 
string for each subprocess by 
the number of times the 
subprocess executes during 
the sample period. 
6. Allocate revenue to subprocesses in proportion to the quantities generated by step 5 and
calculate the cost for each subprocess. 
7. Calculate ROK, and interpret results. 
Table 2.   Three Approaches to KVA (From Housel & Bell, 2001) 
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a.   The Learning Time Approach 
Of the various methods of estimating the knowledge required to generate 
process output from input, the learning time is most often utilized in core processes with a 
high degree of human interaction.  The Learning Time Approach provides a convenient 
estimation because the knowledge required to execute a process is proportional to the time 
required to learn it.  Therefore, the average time required for a person to learn how to 
execute a process is proportional to the amount of new knowledge required.27  Learning 
time must be measured in terms of common units of time throughout the processes of 
interest, and it is these common units that become common units of output.   
b.  Reliability of Learning Time Estimation 
Although the Process Instruction and Binary Query Method approaches to 
measuring the knowledge required to create a process output are more accurate than the 
Learning Time Approach, for many processes such detailed information is not readily 
available. To use the Learning Time Approach to measure knowledge requires that the 
analyst be able to establish the reliability of the estimates.  Reliable estimates of learning 
time can be made when there exists formal training or education requirements to execute a 
core process.  In such a case, the time actively spent learning will provide a very sound 
measure of the knowledge required.  However, within many organizations, the knowledge 
required to execute the core processes is learned by observation and execution of the core 
processes.  In this case, where time is not specifically allocated to learning the required 
knowledge, estimation of learning time is required. To establish reliability of the estimates, 
multiple executives, managers, or subject matter experts with in depth familiarity with the 
overall core process may be surveyed to determine the relative time that must be dedicated 
by a new “average” employee to learn all knowledge to execute the core process.  The 
estimates provided by these multiple sources can be statistically compared to each other to 
identify the level of correlation that exists between respondents.  A correlation of 80% or 
greater between responses is sufficient to establish reliable estimates of the relative 
knowledge embedded within the processes. 
                                                 
27 V. Kanevsky, T. Housel (1998), “The Learning-Knowledge-Value Cycle” in Knowing in Firms: 
Understanding, Managing, and Measuring Knowledge. G. Von Krogh, J. Roos, D. Kleine (Eds), New York: 
Sage. p. 273. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY PROOF OF CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Trident Warrior Experiment is the annual FORCEnet sea trial event that was 
designed to create an “environment in which to assess, in quantitative and qualitative terms, 
FORCEnet systems including technology, tactics/techniques/procedures (TTP’s)—
providing specific insights and dedicated procurement and development decision 
information.”28  The experimentation, led by the Naval Network Warfare Command 
(NNWC), is conducted in a realistic fleet environment aboard vessels at sea to provide 
recommendations to the Military Utility Assessment (MUA) Board regarding the adoption 
of the technologies and processes examined in both qualitative and quantitative measures.  
Along with serving as the Navy’s Functional Component Commander to the US 
Strategic Command, NNWC’s Global Mission is to create “warfighting and business 
options for the Fleet to fight and win in the information age.  (To) deliver and operate a 
reliable, secure and battle-ready global network.   (To) lead the development and integration 
of Information Operations capabilities into the Fleet.”  With the guiding principle of the 
FORCEnet Functional Concept as the means, NNWC seeks to provide the Naval Command 
and Control for the 21st Century.29  To this end, the Trident Warrior experiments serve as a 
primary source of reliable information to the Commander of NNWC regarding technology 
and processes which should be adopted or accelerated through the procurement process.30 
The following proof-of-concept will be used as the “as-is” process with information 
collected from observation and survey of the Second Fleet staff execution the mission 
planning required during the experiment.  The KVA methodology will be applied to analyze 
the theory that process re-engineering and automation will provide significant improvement 
to the planning process in terms of efficiency.  Notional information technologies will be 
                                                 
28 Naval Network Warfare Command, “TW 05 Overview” PowerPoint Presentation presented by Brad 
Poeltler, TW 05 Deputy Director 11 August 2005. 
29 Naval Network Warfare Command, “NETWARCOM Mission Statement and Guiding Principles”. 
Retrieved April 2006 from https://ekm.netwarcom.navy.mil/netwarcom/nnwc-nipr/index.htm 
30 Naval Network Warfare Command, “TW 05 Overview” PowerPoint Presentation  presented by Brad 
Poeltler, TW 05 Deputy Director 11 August 2005. 
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introduced in “to-be” scenarios.  The effects of the notional information technologies will be 
determined through a KVA analysis, which will be compared to the current “as-is” process. 
 
B. SECOND FLEET PLANNING PROCESS IN TW 05 
In order to determine the effects of future information technologies in the planning 
process, a baseline measure of the current “as-is” process must be made.  During Trident 
Warrior 2005 (TW 05), which was held in November-December 2005 in the Virginia Capes 
region, Commander Second Fleet (C2F) served in the role of the Coalition Forces Maritime 
Component Commander (CFMCC).   
The C2F Future Operations Department (FOPs) is largely responsible for the 
development of the operational plan for C2F.  During TW 05, the FOPs developed one 
operational plan focusing on the exploitation of a scenario terrorist camp.  As part of the 
task received from the notional Joint Task Force Headquarters, C2F, as CFMCC, was 
directed to “conduct military operations to conduct sensitive site exploitation” and to 
capture suspected terrorist ringleaders. 
Throughout TW 05, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the C2F staff were 
surveyed in order to identify the subprocesses of the planning process.  The C2F Planning 
Process, as agreed by these SMEs, can be defined in the sequential subprocesses: 
• Mission Analysis: Analysis of the current enemy forces, friendly forces, and 
the task assigned by higher headquarters. 
• Course of Action (COA) Development: Development of feasible options 
from which the CFMCC may prosecute the assigned task. 
• COA Analysis: Evaluation of the COAs developed in terms of the principles 
of leverage, operational maneuver, synergy, tempo, balance, objective, and 
agility.  The COAs are also evaluated by the staff in terms of subject area in 
terms of supportability within that subject matter. 
• COA Comparison and Decision : Presentation of the COAs and the analysis 
to the CFMCC for a determination of which is to be adopted for further 
development into the Concept of Operations (ConOps) which will be 
executed to fulfill the assigned mission.  The CFMCC may additional 
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provide amplifying remarks and questions which will alter the COA selected.  
The CFMCC also has the option of rejecting all COAs developed and require 
that planning start anew. 
• ConOps Development: The selected COA is further developed in detail to a 
level of clarity that allows for it to be executed by subordinate commands. 
• ConOps Approval: The detailed ConOps is presented to the CFMCC to 
ensure that the staff has developed it to his satisfaction.  Further guidance 
may be received direction modification of the ConOps or the ConOps may be 
accepted by the CFMCC.   
This planning process is similar to the JFMCC Planning Process as presented in the 
Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) TACMEMO 3-32-03, with the exception 
of the ConOps Development and ConOps Approval subprocesses.  In the NWDC 
TACMEMO, the ConOps Development is included in the COA Comparison and Decision 
subprocess while the ConOps Approval is part of the Orders Development subprocess.31 
The C2F FOPs assigned an Operational Planning Team (OPT) to conduct the 
planning for the assigned mission.  Individuals selected for assignment to the OPT were 
assigned on a basis of availability and subject area expertise.  The OPT consisted of: 
 OPT Leader:        USN O-5 
 OPT Intelligence Planner:      USA O-5 
 OPT Land Planner:       USA O-4 
 OPT Ground Fires Planner:     USA O-4 
 OPT Special Operations Forces Planner:   USN O-3 
Other CFMCC Planners that interacted with the planning process were: 
 CFMCC:       RN Commodore 
 C2F Operations:      USN O-6 
 C2F Future Operations Officer:    USMC O-5 
 Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) Commander: USN O-6 
 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Executive Officer: USMC O-6 
                                                 
31 Navy Warfare Development Command (2004), “Navy Warfare Development Command TACMEMO 
3-32-03: Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution”. pp. A-29 to A-
33. Newport, Navy Warfare Development Command.  
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 C2F Information Operations Planner:   USAF O-5 
 C2F Fires:       USAF O-4 
 ESG Planner:       USN O-3 
 MEU Planner (S-2A):      USMC O-3 
 MEU Planner (S-6A):      USMC O-3 
The planning process was initiated on Monday 5 December with the receipt of the 
order tasking from the White Cell in the role of the JTF Commander.  Mission Analysis was 
conducted for a period of 1.5 hours, an artificiality brought about by the Trident Warrior 
Experiment.  The week prior to the experiment, the staff had executed planning on the same 
objective, and thus the Mission Analysis presented on 5 December was a product of 28 
November.  The amount of time dedicated during the 28 November planning exercise to the 
development of the Mission Analysis was reported to be four hours by the OPT Land 
Planner and 16 hours by the OPT Intelligence Planner.  For the KVA analysis, the initial 
time required for Mission Analysis was applied for calculations of knowledge and cost. The 
Mission Analysis results were then presented to the CFMCC with four suggestions for COA 
Development.  The CFMCC rejected one of the COAs as unfeasible in accomplishing the 
assigned task. 
Following the Mission Analysis, COA Development was undertaken by the planning 
team.  The OPT Leader, based on the CFMCC guidance, determined that three COAs were 
to be developed for analysis.  The three COAs were “Political Influence,” “Non-kinetic 
Information Operations,” and “Raid.”  The OPT Leader assigned responsibility for the 
development of these three COAs to three different individuals based on their expertise.  He 
assigned himself as the Political Influence COA lead, the C2F Information Operations 
Planner as the Non-Kinetic Information Operations COA lead, and the 24th MEU staff was 
assigned the Raid COA. 
Upon completion of the COA Development, a meeting was convened for COA 
Analysis and staff estimation.  The COA leads presented the COAs developed by their 
particular team.  Upon completion of the presentation of the COAs, the COAs were 
evaluated by the collective group in terms of the principles of leverage, operational 
maneuver, synergy, tempo, balance, objective, and agility.  This was conducted in the open 
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forum to allow all members of the audience to inject comments for group consideration.  
The COAs were also evaluated by the staff in terms of supportability within their subject 
matter expertise.  The results of this analysis were recorded for presentation to the CFMCC. 
Following the COA Analysis conducted by the planning staff, the FOPs Officer and 
the OPT Leader presented the COAs to the CFMCC, Operations Officer, ESG Commander, 
and the MEU Commander.  The CFMCC directed that the Raid COA be developed as the 
ConOps with the modification that the developed ConOps include an alternate insertion 
method. 
Following the CFMCC's decision, the planning team from the 24 MEU that 
developed the Raid COA convened to develop the ConOps for the raid as directed by the 
CFMCC.   
Upon completion of ConOps Development, the ConOps was presented to the 
CFMCC for approval.  The CFMCC approved the ConOps as presented with no 
modification, only amplifying remarks. 
With the CFMCC’s approval, the ConOps would be further developed into the 
operations order for delivery to and execution by the subordinate commands.  This further 
development of the operations order did not occur during TW 05 due to exercise 
considerations. 
 
C.  DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
The data for this research was collected throughout the TW 05 experiment aboard 
the USS IWO JIMA.  During the data collection, members of the C2F, IWO JIMA ESG, 
and 24 MEU staffs were observed and surveyed.  The C2F Planning Process, as described 
above, served as the framework in which data was collected. 
1.  Assumptions 
a.  Length of Sample Period  
The sample period for this analysis was four work days (a single iteration of 
the planning process).  For this reason, some annual cost data is adjusted to reflect this 
sample period. 
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b.  Cost of Human Capital 
Manpower costs for this analysis were derived from the CY 2005 military 
pay scale available from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service32 and the Basic 
Allowance for Housing Calculator available from the Department of Defense Per Diem, 
Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee.33  To determine the costs associated with 
the planning process and subprocesses, estimated salary data was determined for each of the 
actors involved.  This data included the base pay salary for one month and the Basic 
Allowance for Housing (BAH) for one month.  This salary value was then multiplied by 12 
months to determine the yearly salary and housing allowance for the actor.  This yearly total 
was then divided by 2000 hours to determine the cost of that individual for one hour.  This 
value was then multiplied by the time required to accomplish a subprocess for that actor.  
For the CFMCC, the US equivalent of an O-7 was used in determining salary data.  For all 
actors the Norfolk, VA BAH with dependants rate was used with the exception of the 24th 
MEU actors, for whom the Jacksonville, NC BAH with dependants rate was used.  Both 
base pay and BAH data was determined using the 2005 scale.    
c.  Proxy Revenue Assumptions 
Proxy revenue values are based on the assumption that commercial 
organizations produce a comparable product or service as the public sector organization and 
that the processes which generate this output is comparable to that of the public sector 
organization.  As market forces have placed a “value” on the commercial product which 
yields the revenue stream for the commercial organization, this “value” can be applied to the 
public sector organization’s product or service for the sake of generating an analytical or 
hypothetical revenue generating stream.  For this research, three consulting firms which 
produce business strategy plans were surveyed to yield a market comparable value of the 




                                                  
32 DoD, 2005 Military Pay Rates. Retrieved February 2006 from 
http://www.dod.mil/dfas/militarypay/2006militarypaytables/militarypaypriorrates/paytable2005-rev1.pdf. 
33 DoD, Basic Allowance For Housing Rates Calculator. Retrieved February 2006 from 
https://secureapp2.hqda.pentagon.mil/perdiem/bah.html. 
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Debra Conkey Communications 
 Debra develops strategic marketing, advertising, employee 
communications and public relations programs for clients worldwide, and 
includes both traditional and Internet-based strategies. She builds long-term 
relationships with people, so clients can expect consistent, impactful results. 
Debra can assemble and project manage a virtual team of experts to meet 
your more specialized needs. This could include the research, development, 
marketing, and tracking of a Web site, creating an interactive press kit about 
your product or service that can be downloaded from the Internet by the news 
media, developing and implementing an integrated plan for your travel, 
medical, high-tech or other business, and more. Debra has won 38 awards 
and was named Communicator of the Year by the International Association 
of Business Communicators in 1995. 
(http://www.thecommunicators.org/dir/debra-conkey.html) 
Estimated retail value of Plan: $7,500.34 
  
MarCom Interactive 
 We strategize and implement modern media. We translate modern 
media, make it relevant and apply it to our clients' marketing and 
communications needs. 
We immerse ourselves in what is happening in modern media around the 
globe so we can detect trends and help you create opportunities. We show 
you how people are interacting with modern media so together we can craft 
new ways to implement your marketing communications or to add some 
inspiration to your brand. 
Observing trends keeps us ahead and allows us to spot new market 
opportunities. Traversing the landscape of the new ways people are 
communicating, behaving and purchasing lets us help you interact with 
customers the way they expect and welcome - and in ways you may be 
overlooking. 
Modern media isn't stale web sites, mass email, and advertising disguised as 
newsletters or white papers. 
We provide fresh ideas, inspiration, and creativity and we do it with passion, 
professionalism and attention to what you need. 
Our seminars, modern media reports, webcasts, articles, and The Modohood 
(here at our web site) is a great place to begin to explore what modern media 
is and what you can do for your organization. 
(http://marcominteractive.com/about/) 
                                                 
34 D. Conkey. Telephone conversation with Debra Conkey on 25 January 2006. 
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Estimated value of Plan:$20,000 to $50,000.35 
 
 Solute Consulting 
 Founded in 2002, Solute is a young company whose principals and 
employees possess a strong history of contract support to the US Navy, 
extensive operational military experience and a wealth of technical expertise 
that will be leveraged to offer our customers a unique skill-set.  Solute’s team 
of consultants has considerable experience supporting the US Navy both 
directly and as Prime Contractors in a variety of projects. 
The mission of all members of the Solute Consulting team is to be the 
premier Network Centric consulting firm in the world.  All of our team 
members strive to provide our clients with unsurpassed expertise in all 
aspects of Network Centric Warfare and Information and Knowledge 
Management, as well as mapping the information flow and the 
implementation of Collaborative Tools in a tactical environment. 
Combining technical expertise and vast military and tactical experience, 
Solute Consulting profoundly enhances the Warfighters ability to gather and 
manage information in a networked, collaborative environment. 
(http://www.solute.us) 
Estimated value of Plan: $15,000 to $25,000.36 
 
For this research, the mean value of the lowest and highest estimates, 
$28,750, is used as the market-comparable value of the planning process output. 
 
D.  KVA ANALYSIS OF THE “AS-IS” PLANNING PROCESS 
1.  Determining the Revenue Generated by Subprocesses  
The method used to establish estimates of the knowledge resident in the C2F 
Planning Process was the Learning Time Approach.  Through interviews with subject matter 
experts resident in the C2F FOPs, the processes within the planning process were agreed 
upon as described above, with boundaries established between the subprocesses in order to 
utilize the KVA methodology and to establish a valuation of each subprocess. 
Throughout the TW 05 experiment, planning cell members were surveyed to 
determine the knowledge incorporated in a particular phase of planning.  To determine the 
                                                 
35 L. Zimmer. Telephone conversation with Linda Zimmer on 25 January 2006. 
36 A. Blocksidge. Email with Andrew Blocksidge, 30 January 2006. 
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knowledge inherent in a particular planning phase action, the staff members were asked 
questions regarding how long they required to learn how to produce the outputs they 
generated and how long it would require a “competent” O-5 officer to learn the skills to 
generate the same output.  The staff members were to assume that the officer in question 
was from their respective service (US Army Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force Lieutenant 
Colonel, US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, or US Navy Commander) and was from a 
line position (infantry, aviator, surface warfare).  These responses were determined to be 
unusable for analysis due to the inherent biases of the staff members.  To compensate for 
these biases, the “Normalized Learning Time” method was used.  This method, although it 
does not utilize real learning times to determine the relative learning times, it does capture 
the relative learning time for the subprocesses effectively.  
In order to determine relative learning times, after completion of the TW 05 scenario 
select members of the FOPs staff were surveyed as subject matter experts to determine 
which subprocesses of the planning process required to most knowledge to produce.  The 
staff members were asked, “Given 100 days of training time, how much should be spent by 
the competent O-5 baseline officer learning each subprocess?”  Table 3 presents the results 
of this survey: 
 
 
Intelligence Planner OPT Leader Ground Fires Planner 
Normalized Learning Time Values 
Used for KVA Analysis (Average 
of OPT Leader and Ground Fires 
Planner) 
 
Time Spent to Learn 
Subprocess (days) 
Time Spent to Learn 
Subprocess (days) 
Time Spent to Learn 
Subprocess (days) 
Time Spent to Learn Subprocess 
(days) 
Mission 
Analysis 20 20 10 15 
COA 
Development 15 20 20 20 
COA Analysis 30 15 20 17.5 
COA 
Selection 10 10 10 10 
ConOps 
Development 15 30 30 30 
ConOps 
Approval 10 5 10 7.5 
Table 3.   Normalized Learning Time Survey Results 
 
A statistical analysis of the Normalized Learning Times as determined by the three 
members of the FOPs staff found that a 79.3% correlation exists between the Normalized 
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Learning Times offered by the OPT Leader and the Ground Fires Planner.  This high 
correlation lends credibility to these survey results and, thus the average of these two serves 
as the Normalized Learning Times for the subprocesses for this analysis. 
To attribute revenue to the subprocesses of the overall process, the relative amount 
of the knowledge applied to create the process output by each subprocess must be 
determined.  To estimate the knowledge added by a subprocess, the Normalized Learning 
Times presented in the table above is multiplied by the number of actors that are interacting 
with the subprocess input to generate the subprocess output.  For example, Mission Analysis 
has a Normalized Learning Time of 15 days and the subprocess is conducted by two staff 
members (FOPs Ground Planner and FOPs Intel Planner).  Therefore, the knowledge added 
in the subprocess is 30 days.  This method of determining knowledge added by each 
subprocess is conducted for each subprocess and the results added to determine the total 
knowledge added throughout the overall planning process.  Following the determination of 
knowledge value added in the overall planning process the relative knowledge value added 
by each subprocess relative to the overall process is determined as a percentage.  This 
relative knowledge value added (as a percentage of the total process knowledge) is then 
multiplied by the market comparable value of the overall process output to determine the 
value of each subprocess. 
Table 4 shows the calculations for the value attributed to each subprocess and the 
















Mission Analysis    30 5.85% $1,682.93 
  Ground Planner 15    
  Intel Planner 15    
COA Development    120 23.41% $6,731.71 
  OPT Leader 20    
        
  IO Planner 20    
  SOF Planner 20    
        
  MEU XO 20    
  MEU Planner (S-2A) 20    
  MEU Planner (S-6A) 20    
COA Analysis    157.5 30.73% $8,835.37 
  OPT Leader 17.5    
  Intel Planner 17.5    
  Ground Planner 17.5    
  Ground Fires Planner 17.5    
  IO Planner 17.5    
  SOF Planner 17.5    
  CFMCC Fires Planner 17.5    
  MEU XO 17.5    
  ESG Planner 17.5    
COA Selection    70 13.66% $3,926.83 
  CFMCC 10    
  CFMCC OpsO 10    
  MEU XO 10    
  ESG Commander 10    
  FOPs O 10    
  OPT Leader 10    
  CFMCC Fires Planner 10    
ConOps Development    90 17.56% $5,048.78 
  MEU XO 30    
  MEU Planner (S-2A) 30    
  MEU Planner (S-6A) 30    
ConOps Approval    45 8.78% $2,524.39 
  CFMCC 7.5    
  CFMCC OpsO 7.5    
  MEU XO 7.5    
  ESG Commander 7.5    
  FOPs O 7.5    
  OPT Leader 7.5    
Total for Planning Process   512.5 512.5 100.00% $28,750.00 
Table 4.   Value Attributed to “As-Is” Subprocesses and Planning Process 
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2.  Determining Process and Subprocess Costs 
Table 5 demonstrates the time required to complete the phases of the planning 







Total Manpower  
Cost 
% of Total 
Actual Cost 
Mission Analysis    $961.74 24.62% 
  Ground Planner $44.62 4 $178.47  
  Intel Analyst $48.95 16 $783.27  
COA Development    $1,159.22 29.67% 
  OPT Leader $48.95 1 $48.95  
       
  IO Planner $51.13 4 $204.51  
  SOF Planner $38.94 4 $155.78  
       
  MEU XO $56.28 6 $337.68  
  MEU Planner (S-2A) $37.46 6 $224.73  
  MEU Planner (S-6A) $31.26 6 $187.57  
COA Analysis    $584.92 14.97% 
 OPT Leader $48.95 1.42 $69.52  
 Intel Analyst $48.95 1.42 $69.52  
 Ground Planner $44.62 1.42 $63.36  
  Ground Fires Planner $41.29 1.42 $58.63  
 IO Planner $51.13 1.42 $72.60  
 SOF Planner $38.94 1.42 $55.30  
 CFMCC Fires Planner $43.98 1.42 $62.46  
 MEU XO $56.28 1.42 $79.92  
 ESG Planner $43.98 1.42 $53.63  
COA Selection    $232.45 5.95% 
  CFMCC $69.15 0.6 $41.49  
  CFMCC OpsO $59.50 0.6 $35.70  
  MEU XO $56.28 0.6 $33.77  
  ESG Commander $59.50 0.6 $35.70  
  FOPs O $50.05 0.6 $30.03  
  OPT Leader $48.95 0.6 $29.37  
  CFMCC Fires Planner $43.98 0.6 $26.39  
ConOps Development    $624.98 16.00% 
  MEU XO $56.28 5 $281.40  
  MEU Planner (S-2A) $37.46 5 $187.28  
  MEU Planner (S-6A) $31.26 5 $156.31  
ConOps Approval    $343.43 8.79% 
  CFMCC $69.15 1 $69.15  
  CFMCC OpsO $59.50 1 $59.50  
  MEU XO $56.28 1 $56.28  
  ESG Commander $59.50 1 $59.50  
  FOPs O $50.05 1 $50.05  
  OPT Leader $48.95 1 $48.95  
Total for Planning  
Process Iteration   44.2 $2,055.78 100.00% 
Table 5.   Manpower Costs of “As-Is” Subprocesses and Planning Process 
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3.  Determining the ROI for the Process and Subprocesses 
The resulting analysis provided the following insights into the ROI of the human 
















([V-C]/C x 100%) 
Mission 
Analysis 5.85 $1682.93 $961.74 74.99% 
COA 
Development 23.41 $6,731.71 $1,159.22 480.71% 
COA Analysis 30.73 $8,835.37 $584.92 1410.52% 
COA Approval 13.66 $3926.83 $232.45 1589.33% 
ConOps 
Development 17.56 $5,048.78 $624.98 707.83% 
ConOps 
Approval 8.78 $2,524.39 $343.43 635.05% 
Planning 
Process Total 100 $28,750.00 $3,906.75 635.91% 
Table 6.   ROI of “As-Is” Subprocesses and the Planning Process 
 
E.   “TO-BE” PLANNING PROCESS 
This scenario describes the JFMCC Planning Process aided with the developmental 
IT presented in Chapter II.  The IT systems noted (CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox) are systems 
that were under development for the US Army Research Laboratory, and thus were focused 
on military planning in a land warfare environment.  In this scenario, it is assumed that the 
systems developed are capable of modification to aid in the planning of a naval forces 
scenario. 
1. The Cost of IT 
The estimated cost of the CoRaven, Weasel, Fox suite of decision support tools is 
not readily available for this research for various reasons.  Key among these is the fact that 
the funding for the suite of tools was provided by the Army Research Laboratory to multiple 
organizations, particularly academic institutions.  At these institutions, the students who did 
much of the programming did not receive direct compensation for the work involved with 
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development of the systems and, therefore, did not maintain records of work consistently.  
Therefore, for this research an estimated per unit price is derived from commercial products 
that incorporate similar technologies.  For the CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox systems, the 
highest purchase prices of a comparable commercial product will be used to provide the 
most conservative calculations in the KVA analysis of the notional process. 
The fundamental logic underlying the CoRaven systems programming is Bayesian 
Networks.  Three commercially available software tools were identified as decision support 
tools that use Bayesian Networks as their foundation.  These three programs are Bayesia 
Lab Version 4.037, Hugin Explorer38, and Agena Risk39.  The purchase prices of these 
products vary greatly, at $51,210.70, $4,336.65 and $1,895.09.  For this research the highest 
purchase price of $51,210.70 will serve as the estimated purchase price for the CoRaven 
tool.  Assuming a product lifespan of five years, this calculates to a per year cost of 
$10,242.14.  For this research, it is assumed that the naval command using the tool will 
deploy for six months every year, thus a weekly ownership cost of $393.93 is estimated.  
Based upon the Trident Warrior experiment, it is assumed that the planning staff will 
generate one plan a week. 
The fundamental logics underlying the Weasel and Fox systems are genetic 
algorithm and combinations and permutations of the capabilities and rules selected by the 
human operator.  A survey of commercially available DSSs was conducted and three tools 
were identified as having similar logic:  AI Trilogy ($1,245.00)40, Palisade Risk Optimizer 
                                                 
37 BayesiaLab Version 4.0 is a product developed by Bayesia SA of Laval Cedex, France.  The purchase 
price of BayesiaLab v. 4.0 Professional Edition with Technical Support was used for determining purchase 
cost of the software.  The purchase price of 39,600 Euros was converted to US Dollars using a conversion rate 
of 1.29319 US Dollars per Euro. Further information regarding the BayesiaLab product and Bayesia S/A  is 
available at http://www.bayesia.com.  Retrieved May 2006. 
38 Hugin Explorer is a product developed by Hugin Expert A/S of Aalborg, Denmark.  The purchase price 
of 24,995 Danish Krones was converted to US Dollars using a conversion rate of 5.7637 Danish Krones to US 
Dollar.  Further information regarding the Hugin Explorer and Hugin Expect S/A is available at 
http://www.hugin.com/.  Retrieved May 2006. 
39 Agena Risk is a product developed by Agena Limited of London, United Kingdom.  The purchase price 
of 1000 British Pounds was converted to US Dollars using a conversion rate of 1.895.09 US Dollars to British 
Pound.  Further information regarding the Agena Risk product and Agena Limited is available at 
http://www.agena.co.uk.  Retrieved May 2006. 
40 AI Trilogy is a product developed by Ward Systems Group, Inc. of Frederick, MD.  Further 
information regarding AI Trilogy and Ward Systems Group, Inc is available http://www.wardsystems.com.  
Retrieved May 2006. 
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Industrial Version ($1,195.00)41, and Discipulus Professional Edition ($495)42.  The highest 
purchase price of $1,245.00 is estimated as the purchase price for both the Weasel and Fox 
systems.  Assuming a five year lifespan of the tool and the above stated deployment cycle, 
the weekly ownership cost of the decision support tools is calculated as $9.58 per tool. 
2. The Reengineered Planning Process 
The primary change from the “as-is” current planning process to the “to-be” 
planning process is the introduction of the CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox suite of decision 
support tools.  The introduction of these systems will significantly affect the Mission 
Analysis, COA Development, and COA Comparison subprocesses. 
During the Mission Analysis subprocess, the Intelligence Analyst dedicated the bulk 
of the time finding, collecting, and preparing for presentation information regarding the 
enemy forces and the surrounding battlespace.  With the addition of the CoRaven and 
Weasel systems as an aid to the Mission Analysis process, the Intelligence Analyst will 
input the decision making logic, in the form of a logic tree during predeployment periods or 
during periods of calm.  The CoRaven system will generate probabilities of likely enemy 
actions and automatically transfer data to the Weasel system for enemy COA generation.  
With the enemy data transferred to the Weasel system, the Intelligence Analyst would select 
basic assumptions through the graphical interface.  Then the Weasel system will generate 
the set of potential enemy COAs.  From this set of enemy COAs the Intelligence Analyst 
will select those which he determines to be the most relevant to the situation by which 
friendly COAs will be compared.  For this research it is assumed that the time required to 
execute the Mission Analysis tasks performed by the Intelligence Analyst will be 25% of 
that currently required in the planning process.  It is also assumed that 50% of the 
knowledge required by the Intelligence Analyst to complete the Mission Analysis tasks will 
be resident in the IT systems.  
With the implementation of the DSS Suite, the human labor required to develop and 
compare potential friendly COAs against the expected enemy COAs will be significantly 
                                                 
41 Risk Optimizer is an add-in developed for use with the Microsoft Excel program by the Palisades 
Corporation of Ithaca, NY.  Futher information regarding Risk Optimizer and the Palisades Corporation is 
available at http://www.palisade.com.  Retrieved May 2006. 
42 Discipulus is a product developed by Register Machine Learning Technologies, Incorporated of 
Littleton, CO.  Further information regarding the Discipulus product and RML Technologies, Inc. is available 
at http://www.aimlearning.com.  Retrieved May 2006. 
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reduced.  The potential enemy COAs deemed most significant to the commander and the 
planning staff (during the Mission Analysis subprocess) will be transferred automatically 
from the Weasel system to the Fox system.  The Fox system will then generate the potential 
friendly COAs for the staff based on inputted data (such as organization, terrain constraints, 
stated constraints and restraints, etc.) and will also run the combat simulator to determine 
the fitness of each COA against the set of potential enemy COAs.  With the implementation 
of the Fox system, the two distinct subprocesses of COA Development and COA Analysis 
will be combined into a single subprocess.  It is assumed that the COA 
Development/Analysis process aided by the Fox DSS will require one hour.  It is also 
assumed that 75% of the knowledge required to accomplish the current COA Development 
and COA Analysis tasks will be resident in the Fox DSS.   
Based upon the SME opinion, anecdotal information claims that the quality of the 
products produced with the aid of the CoRaven, Weasel and Fox systems are at least as 
good as those produced without the systems.  However, since the information does not 
provide conclusive evidence it is assumed for this research that the value of the process 
output for the “to-be” reengineered process is the same as that of the “as-is” process.43 
 
F. KVA ANALYSIS OF THE “TO-BE” PROCESS 
The following KVA analysis is provided to determine the change in the ROI of the 
planning process and the subprocesses with the introduction of the DSS suite to aid the 
process.  The analysis will also provide a ROI for the information technology based upon 
the estimates and assumptions presented above. 
1. Determining the Value of the “To-Be” Process IT 
To determine the value of the decision support tools provided by the notional IT, the 
value of subprocess outputs and the planning process output are assumed to be unchanged 
from the current process.  The value of the output of the “to-be” COA 
Development/Analysis subprocess is assumed to be the sum of the values of the current 
COA Development and COA Analysis subprocesses.  Table 7 demonstrates the value which 
is attributed to the human actors and the decision support tools in the “to-be” subprocesses 
                                                 
43 Per phone conversation with Professor Caroline Hayes at the University of Minnesota on 26 April 
2006. 
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affected by the introduction of the DSS suite.  All other subprocess are assumed to be 
unaffected by the DSS suite and therefore are excluded from Table 7. 
 
Process Actor/Asset 
Total Knowledge For 
Subprocess  
(Learning Time) 
% of Subprocess 
Knowledge  
Attributed to Process 
Asset 
% of Total 
Process 
Knowledge 
Value Attributed to 
Subprocess and 
Actor/Asset 
Mission Analysis  30  5.85% $1,682.93 




7.5 25% 1.46% $420.73 
COA 
Development/Analysis 
 227.5  54.15% $15,567.07 
 Human Actors 69.4 25% 13.54% $3,891.77 
 Fox tool 208.1 75% 40.61% $11,675.30 
Table 7.   Value Attributed to IT in “To-Be” Process 
 
2. Determining “To-Be” Process and Subprocess Costs 
Table 8 demonstrates the costs of the human actors and IT associated with the “to-










IT Cost  
(Weekly Cost) Total Cost
% of Total 
Actual Cost
                
Mission Analysis       $374.29 $403.51 $777.79 31.50% 
  Ground Planner $44.62 4 $178.47       
  Intel Analyst $48.95 4 $195.82       
                
COA Development/ 
         Analysis       $480.63 $9.58 $490.21 19.86% 
  OPT Leader $48.95 1 $48.95       
  Intel Analyst $48.95 1 $48.95       
  IO Planner $51.13 1 $51.13       
  SOF Planner $38.94 1 $38.94       
  Ground Planner $44.62 1 $44.62       
  MEU XO $56.28 1 $56.28       
  MEU Planner (S-2A) $37.46 1 $37.46       
  MEU Planner (S-6A) $31.26 1 $31.26       
  Ground Fires Planner $41.29 1 $41.29       
  CFMCC Fires Planner $43.98 1 $43.98       
  ESG Planner $37.76 1 $37.76       
                
COA Selection       $232.45   $232.45 9.42% 
  CFMCC $69.15 0.6 $41.49       
  CFMCC OpsO $59.50 0.6 $35.70       
  MEU XO $56.28 0.6 $33.77       
  ESG Commander $59.50 0.6 $35.70       
  FOPs O $50.05 0.6 $30.03       
  OPT Leader $48.95 0.6 $29.37       
  CFMCC Fires Planner $43.98 0.6 $26.39       
                
ConOps Development       $624.98   $624.98 25.31% 
  MEU XO $56.28 5 $281.40       
  MEU Planner (S-2A) $37.46 5 $187.28       
  MEU Planner (S-6A) $31.26 5 $156.31       
                
ConOps Approval       $343.43   $343.43 13.91% 
  CFMCC $69.15 1 $69.15       
  CFMCC OpsO $59.50 1 $59.50       
  MEU XO $56.28 1 $56.28       
  ESG Commander $59.50 1 $59.50       
  FOPs O $50.05 1 $50.05       
  OPT Leader $48.95 1 $48.95       
                
Total for Planning  
Process Iteration     44.2 $2,055.78 $413.08 $2,468.87 100.00% 
Table 8.   Manpower and IT Costs Associated with “To-Be” Planning Process 
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3. Determining ROI for “To-Be” Process and Subprocess 





(% of total) 
Value Attributed to Process 
(V) 




([V-C]/C x 100%) 
Mission Analysis 5.85 $1,682.93 $777.79 116.37% 
COA Development/ 
Analysis 
54.15 $15,567.07 $490.21 3075.59% 
COA Approval 13.66 $3,926.83 $232.45 1589.33% 
ConOps 
Development 
17.56 $5,048.78 $624.98 707.83% 
ConOps Approval 8.78 $2,524.39 $343.43 635.05% 
Planning Process 
Total 
100.00 $28,750 $2,468.87 1064.5% 
Table 9.   ROI of “To-Be” Process and Subprocesses 
 
4. Determining ROI of Information Technology 
To determine the ROI for the notional DSS suite, the value (see Table 7) and costs 
(see Table 8) associated with the decision support tools from the above analysis are used in 
the traditional ROI formula.  The total revenue attributed to the DSS suite is $12,096.03.  
The total cost associated with the DSS suite is $413.08. 
 




This calculated ROI states that for every $1 invested in the acquisition of the 
notional DSS suite, $28.28 are returned. 
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G. COMPARISION OF THE “AS-IS” AND “TO-BE” PROCESSES 
The following figures and tables demonstrate the resulting changes in execution 
time, the change in cost, and the change in the ROI associated with the introduction of the 
notional DSS suite to the JFMCC Planning Process.   Figure 7 compares the execution time 
required for the “as-is” and “to-be” planning processes. 
 
Figure 7.   Execution Time Comparison of “As-Is” and “To-Be” Process44 
 
With the introduction of the automated systems, the time required to execute the 
Mission Analysis and COA Development and Analysis are reduced to 25% and 13.5% of 
the “as-is” subprocesses.  In the notional “to-be” process, execution time is reduced to 
38.6% of the current requirement. 
                                                 
44 Execution time is determined as the maximum “touch time” required for a subprocess.  The execution 
time for the “as-is” COA Development/Analysis is the sum of the time required of the two distinct 
subprocesses of “COA Development” and “COA Analysis.” 
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Figure 8 shows graphically the cost differences between the “as-is” planning process 
and the “to-be” planning process. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Cost Comparison of the “As-Is” and “To-Be” Process45 
 
In the “to-be” JFMCC Planning Process the cost associated with Mission Analysis is 
reduced to 80% of the “as-is” subprocess,  COA Development/Analysis costs are reduced to 
28% of the current subprocess, and the entire planning process costs are reduced to 63% of 
the “as-is” process. 
                                                 
45 Costs associated with the “as-is” COA Development/Analysis is the sum of the two distinct 
subprocesses of the “as-is” planning process.  Costs of the “to-be” process include both manpower and IT 
costs. 
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Figure 9 demonstrates the affects of the introduction on the notional DSS and 
process reengineering on the ROI values of the subprocesses and the planning process. 
 
 
Figure 9.   ROI Comparison of the “As-Is” and “To-Be” Planning Process 
 
With the introduction of the decision support tools to the JFMCC Planning Process, 
the ROI values of the Mission Analysis and COA Development/Analysis 41% and 2283%, 
respectively.  The overall process ROI is improved by 429%.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This Proof of Concept was generated using subject matter expert input and 
observations from one execution of the JFMCC Planning Process during TW 05 experiment.  
Therefore, the data presented in this research can not be assumed to be accurate for all 
possible scenarios.  Additionally, given exercise restrictions, entire staff planners from the 
IWO JIMA Strike Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit were not available; 
therefore the calculations presented were based solely on available data with the limited 
staffs participating in TW 05. The JFMCC Planning Process, as prescribed in NWDC 
TACMEMO 3-32-03, was recently adopted by the Second Fleet staff prior to the TW 05 
experiment.  Therefore, procedures and policies relating to the planning process may have 
been evolving during execution.  More accurate calculations could be made of the planning 
process through observation in actual operations during a deployment period. 
Likewise, the CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox DSS tools were developed for use in a 
ground conflict scenario, with opposing armies battling using conventional tactics.  The 
tools do not currently have function in naval warfare environments, nor do they possess the 
capability to look at potential COAs that include non-kinetic warfare or asymmetric threats.  
The systems are introduced to illustrate the potential of IT to support the planning process.  
The cost associated with this IT is an estimate, based upon a survey of currently available 
commercial products.  This survey of commercial products identified products with similar 
underlying logics, not necessarily similar functionality.  A custom DSS suite developed 
specifically for the Department of the Navy may cost considerably more or less. 
 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The KVA Analysis of the current JFMCC Planning Process reveals that the process 
inefficiencies are most significant in the Mission Analysis and COA Development 
subprocesses.  These subprocesses therefore represent the facets of the planning process 
with the greatest potential for improvement through the application of IT systems.  Decision 
support tools of similar capability as the CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox systems will likely 
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provide significant improvement to the planning process through automation of portions of 
these subprocesses. The improvements to the process through automation will be most 
readily quantified in terms of improvement in planning time requirements, cost savings, and 
improved efficiency as measured in terms of ROI.   
1.  Planning Time 
Among the key capabilities required for the implementation of the FORCEnet 
Functional Concept is to provide decision makers the ability to make and implement good 
decisions quickly.  Through the adoption of IT, such as the DSSs identified in this research, 
the time required to plan military operations would be decreased by 61.4%.  While this 
improvement is specific to the planning of an operation, the residual effects would allow for 
execution of the assigned mission more quickly. 
2. Cost Savings 
The manpower cost associated with planning present the most quantifiable 
advantage of the adoption of IT systems to support the JFMCC Planning Process.  With the 
implementation of the DSSs presented in this research, it is projected that the over-all cost 
of generating the plan would decrease by 37% to include the cost associated with the IT 
systems.  
3. Improved ROI 
The ROI of the overall JFMCC Planning Process was markedly improved from the 
current process to the “to-be” process.  With the introduction of the notional DSS suite to 
aid the planning process, an ROI improvement for the overall process of 429% is projected. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE US NAVY 
The JFMCC Planning Process was only recently formalized with the publication of 
NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03 and the implementation on the operational Navy Fleet 
continues.  The JFMCC Planning Process, as executed during Trident Warrior 05, does not 
take advantage of IT as a tool to improve the process or the product of the planning.  The 
leadership of the US Navy must take the initiative to bring IT capabilities to this most 
critical of decision-making functions for the FORCEnet Functional Concept to be realized. 
Through the development and adoption of DSSs to aid the planning process, with 
similar capabilities to those provided by the CoRaven, Weasel, and Fox systems, the effects 
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of the process improvement will be significant.  Through the decreased labor required in 
plan generation, the human actors currently employed in lower-level command and control 
functions will be able to dedicate themselves to higher-level functions that require more 
judgment and insight that only the human can provide.  Likewise, the ability of a planning 
staff to generate a plan in a timelier manner will allow for the execution of the operations at 
a faster tempo.  This will leave the enemy unbalanced and in a reactionary mode to US 
actions. 
Investment in IT systems, just as any other investment, always carries inherent risk.  
The costs of such systems will be significant during development and implementation while 
the returns of the investment will be only realized over the life of the system.  Using the 
KVA methodology, decision makers are able to gain insight into organizational performance 
efficiencies and inefficiencies.  Using the analysis methodology to evaluate prospective 
investments, the decision makers are equipped with risk data and the potential value of these 
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